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patterns of power and inequality in a rapidly changing world system. It explores how educational multilateralism has responded and contributed to the broader reordering of international political, economic, and social reforms since 1945.7 To do so, I review the history of educational multilateralism as linked to an interpretation of twentieth-century world order drawn from the work of critical theorists in international relations. and other social forces continue to struggle and construct the shape and meaning of world order itself."
Critical international relations theory draws from Antonio Gramsci's work on the construction of societal compromises in early twentieth-century capitalist societies, in order to explore the relative stability and potential for change across different historical periods. Gramsci argued that the basis of stability could be found in processes of mediation between capital and civil society that included the development of consensual ideologies and institutions. He showed how the modern European state had begun to use consensual rather than coercive means to mediate various class interests, an approach that included constructing notions of citizenship and national identity, popularizing the theme of national progress, reinforcing public institutions, and institutionalizing the civil and political rights of liberal democracy.12 Later critical theorists argued that the construction of such consensus (or "hegemony" as Gramsci termed it) also contained an inherent tendency toward contestation and change.13 Thus, the extension of rights and the development of public institutions opened up a distinctive political space, an expanding "civil society." 14 In this new political space lay the potential for the development of powerful social forces whose demands could escalate beyond political and civil rights to include a more fundamental redistribution of resources. Domestic patterns of compromise and contestation always have had an international dimension, insofar as domestic social relations have been embedded in a steadily integrating world economic system.'5 Critical international relations theorists, however, emphasize the unique way in which these patterns of national societal compromise were stabilized into the postwar world order through purposive forms of intergovernmental cooperation, particularly the creation of multilateral institutions. They also show how 14 The term "civil society" as used by Gramsci refers to the distinctive political space and the collective institutions created as part of the development of the twentieth-century capitalist-democratic state. Civil society is the arena in which hegemony is both constructed and contested; it is the realm of ideology and of voluntary association. 15 counterhegemonic social forces emerged at a transnational level and played a part in the evolution of this new multilateralism. In this framing, critical theorists move away from classical accounts of postwar international relations that place cold war politics and U.S. hegemony at the center. Although these remain important factors in shaping the postwar order, critical international relations theorists set out to explore how postwar multilateralism provided a distinctive political space, through which an "imagined" world order was negotiated, constructed, and (at times) contested.'6 These basic insights can be used to explore the evolution of educational multilateralism since 1945 as a product of the post-World War II world order, one in which the West's consolidation of the Keynesian welfare state came to be explicitly linked to the development of a stable, liberal world economic and interstate system. The central structures of postwar multilateralism-the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutionssupported the stabilization, expansion, and further integration of a world capitalist economy. Their work also was linked to the cold war project of incorporating developing nations into the Western society of states. As is widely noted, these institutions spread a model of national development that emphasized modernization. At the same time, however, they also encouraged development based on the societal compromise reached in Western societies, one emphasizing state intervention in domestic social welfare and the creation of national educational systems. Their programs and activities helped to extend notions of rights and entitlements, and often were seen in relation to broader ideals and expectations about redistribution at a global level. I thus describe these institutions as part of a limited regime of "redistributive multilateralism." Of course, sharp contradictions existed between ideologies of equality and redistribution embedded within multilateral institutions and the actual commitments of Western nations. Yet by spreading new notions about redistribution and entitlement and by helping to create new nation-state actors, postwar multilateral institutions constructed new political spaces within which opposing social forces might later come together to demand alternatives. proaches to "redistributive multilateralism," some of which focused on poverty alleviation and others on more radical promises of global entitlement. Although these alternatives remained sharply constrained, as reflected in the limited flow of new resources and new models into the educational development work of multilateral organizations, they also had important consequences.
An even greater challenge to educational multilateralism occurred as part of the erosion of the postwar world order after the mid-1970s. In that period, dramatic global changes in the nature of production and exchange helped to undermine the societal compromises embodied in the Keynesian welfare states of the advanced capitalist world. They also led to the fragmentation of the Third World and the economic marginalization of many developing countries. Among the many shifts in multilateralism and interstate relations of that period, the most important for educational multilateralism are (1) the erosion of funding for "redistributive" forms of multilateralism, in a move that has broadly paralleled the dismantling of domestic social welfare institutions and the introduction of neoliberal approaches to public policy-neoliberalism advocates deregulation and the opening of national markets to international trade and competition and emphasizes the use of market mechanisms in public service delivery and a more limited role for the state; (2) the strengthening of "disciplinary" forms of international cooperation, that is, those that support the containment of domestic demands for social programs, as typified both in IMF/ World Bank programs of structural adjustment and in the diffusion of neoliberal approaches to public policy through multilateral organizations like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); (3) the emergence of "defensive" forms of multilateralism aimed at promoting the competitiveness of blocs of advanced industrial countries (e.g., the OECD, European Union The end of World War II marked the emergence of a relatively stable period worldwide, particularly among the West's advanced capitalist states. It also saw the rapid growth of international multilateral organizations with mandates linked to the preservation of this order and of educational cooperation as an important focus for multilateral activities.J. G. Ruggie describes this as a period of "embedded liberalism," because a liberal commitment to the expansion of the world market as a foundation for progress came to be embedded in domestic and multilateral institutions seeking to balance and stabilize the market itself.'7 At a national level, the postwar era witnessed the rise of the Keynesian welfare state, in which high-wage full employment and social security were guaranteed through rapidly expanding consumption and production. Internationally, a set of multilateral institutions was formed whose purpose was to buffer economic fluctuations, provide for peace and security, and diffuse this liberal, modernizing approach to national development.
In many ways, these consensual institutional frameworks arose as a defensive alternative to the communist model for domestic and international redistribution being consolidated in the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries. Yet international agreements such as the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Charter, which refer to goals including "full employment" and "social security," make it clear that the formation of postwar multilateral institutions also must be traced back to the rise of social security and welfare entitlements in the West during the first half of the twentieth century.'8 Postwar multilateral arrangements were distinct in the way they tied the goals of security and peace to both the expansion of a stable, liberal world economy and the development of national society security and welfare institutions.'9 The United States played a central if often ambiguous role in this effort, acting not simply as the traditional military-economic hegemon but also as the leading proponent of an international consensus among Western states about the nature and constituent parts of a world order itself.20
The evolution of educational multilateralism reflected the broader patterns and contradictions that emerged within this new formulation of security and world order. In the heady years following the Allied victory, governments and nongovernmental actors converged around the notion that education should be considered a key issue for international organization.21 Support for educational multilateralism erupted from many directions, and among the core Allied powers it was considered a key to the postwar reconstruction of the interstate system via the denazification and scientific and technical development of Europe.22 Less-developed countries argued that it was crucial to international "equalization," a position supported by Soviet representatives.23 A vocal group of predominantly U.S. nongovernmental organizations and educators viewed international cooperation in education as a necessary foundation for a peaceful, democratic, and civilized international society.24 In this they were supported by the French, who sought the continuation of the League of Nation's International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC). 25 What eventually emerged, through negotiations between 1942 and 1946, was the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (Unesco), a specialized UN agency that was autonomously governed by a general conference of delegates from member nations and an executive board of nominated, but politically independent representatives.26 The organization was to be financed through weighted assessments on member 21 The idea for an international body for educational and cultural cooperation was, of course, not entirely new. . 25 The leading spokesman for an international educational organization at the UN founding conference was Henri Bonnet, a member of the French delegation and former director of the IIIC. 26 Major decisions are made by the general conference, in which each member nation has one vote. The executive board governs the organization between general conferences. It originally comprised "independent" representatives nominated by the General Assembly. As the cold war escalated in the 1950s, however, members of the board were political appointees of member states. As a specialized UN agency Unesco is relatively autonomous, though it is expected to report to the UN Economic and Social Council and to work within the spirit of the council's main resolutions. nations, and Unesco was given a mandate to promote a wide range of global educational and intellectual relations via responsibility for five thematic areas: education, culture (including libraries, museums, and fine arts), science, social science, and mass communications. In each field, Unesco was to act as an arena for intergovernmental debate, a clearinghouse for information, a regulatory or norm-setting body, a provider of services and programs to member states, and a supporter of nongovernmental linkages and exchanges-all, it might be added, within a budget that never exceeded that of a midsized university.27
During the 1950s, Unesco and other postwar multilateral institutions faced profound uncertainty about their future roles. Many of these institutions, especially the United Nations and its specialized organizations, have mandates that contain universal notions of civil, political, economic, and social rights and redistribution (including the right to education).28 Thus, Unesco's constitution commits it to promoting the "common welfare of mankind" as well as a universal right to education. Yet the U.S. decision to channel its resources for postwar reconstruction bilaterally under the Marshall Plan left UN specialized agencies such as Unesco profoundly underfunded. The U.S. decision also signaled the UN's rapid politicization as East-West tensions intensified. The gap between Unesco's wide mandate and limited budget as well as between the formal universalism of its mandate and the increasingly divergent interests of its member nations made the organization profoundly unstable. These tensions had two key side effects. First, the involvement of nongovernmental actors-who had played a crucial part in establishing many of the UN specialized agencies and in advocating the inclusion of social welfare goals in the UN charter-was quickly displaced by a primary engagement with states and governments.29 Second, as the organization became more firmly tied to the politics of the interstate system, support for more practical efforts of regional and national educational planning emerged as the central focus of its activities.
This emphasis on the development of national educational systems and plans was enhanced by the sudden availability of large-scale funding for "redistributive multilateralism" in the 1950s. In this decade, as U.S. government officials became convinced that the Third World held the key to both the expansion of a liberal world economy and the containment of communism, The rapid rise of resources for educational assistance (see Table 1 ) strengthened Unesco's authority and expanded its task, allowing the organi- zation to move beyond East-West tensions and the constraints of its limited core budget.39 Yet these resources also embedded Unesco's approach to education in the discourses and practices of a larger international development regime, where the promise of universal rights and global redistribution was being interpreted and enacted in very specific and limited ways.40 Some of these limitations can be seen in Unesco's failure to get donors to direct resources toward its key causes: literacy and mass public education. International development assistance in education during the 1960s and early 1970s largely remained focused on secondary, vocational, and higher education in fields directly linked to economic modernization. Assistance also continued to be offered primarily in training and expertise through bilateral aid programs, keeping it tied to the goods and services of Western donors.41 Furthermore, OECD countries continued to prefer bilateral channels for development aid, which allowed them to divorce assistance from broader negotiations between the North and South about the institutions of world order while tying it to their own domestic services and geopolitical interests.42 Even deeper limitations are suggested by how Unesco framed its own goals and purposes in education. Increasingly, Unesco adopted a technical/ planning approach to educational multilateralism. It defined educational problems using Western schooling as a prototype and constructed the purposes of educational assistance around the provision of top-down scientific planning and attention to finance. Furthermore, the organization placed responsibility for mass education at the doorstep of "national political will," a framing that simultaneously circumvented notions of global redistributive entitlement and justified Unesco's concentration on national educa-39 Sewell, Unesco and World Politics; and "Unesco: Pluralism Rampant" (n. 22 above). 40 A second paradigm for educational multilateralism emerged out of the UN's service-oriented programs, UNDP and Unicef. Because such organizations do not have representative general assemblies and rely primarily on the voluntary contributions of Northern donor countries, they experienced Third World calls for a NIEO less intensely. Their approach to these demands was to focus on meeting "basic human needs," arguing that earlier forms of development assistance, focused on emergency relief and modernization, had neglected the poor. Service-oriented programs consequently advocated channeling assistance instead to basic social services-education, health, and nutrition.
The basic-needs approach described in table 2 gained the support of the more social-democratic OECD countries, which led to a rapid expansion in Unicef's funding base. It was also an approach with broad popular appeal, leading to successful national fundraising campaigns and the support of emergent international nongovernmental development organizations.52 It The World Bank also responded to the challenges of the 1970s with an alternative approach to development, which it termed "redistribution with growth." Less radical than either the NIEO or the basic-needs alternatives, this strategy reflected the Bank's relative insulation from developing-country demands and the stability of its resource base.56 Nonetheless, because the World Bank's legitimacy and funding depend on serving the broader goal of Third World development, it was forced to respond to the challenges to traditional models of economic development contained in NIEO demands. Its redistribution-with-growth approach helped to expand its legitimacy and increase subscriptions to the International Development Association (IDA), the World Bank's concessional finance facility, at a time when its traditional focus on infrastructure had begun to be discredited and expanding commercial financing for development threatened its predominance.57
Redistribution with growth emphasized investment in the productive capacities of the poor, especially via rural development projects. It did not include the transfer of income, consumption, or assets to the poor; it paid little attention to the structure of production or the government's economic role; and it ignored redistribution at an international level.58 As such, it fit neatly the liberal model's conception of development as economic growth and Initially, education showed signs of being an important element within the Bank's new redistributive strategy. As early as 1968, the Bank's new president, Robert McNamara, began to press for the expansion of educational lending, which he linked both to individual productivity and to social stability.60 Phillip Coombs was hired to undertake an analysis of the relationship between education and rural poverty, which resulted in the broadening of the Bank's education sector work. A 1974 sector paper announced a new Bank interest in primary and nonformal education.6' Yet despite initial signs of enthusiasm, education remained peripheral to the bank's poverty programs, which in turn amounted to less than 15 percent of World Bank expenditure in the 1970s.62 Education spending continued to be concentrated at the secondary and tertiary levels. And while the Bank rapidly developed in-house expertise in education, this suggested more a continuation of Unesco's earlier emphasis on educational planning and finance, albeit with a greater emphasis on education and economic productivity, than a clear departure. Nonetheless, through its superior access to information and research, the frequent use of cofinancing, and the sheer volume of its loans, the Bank was on its way to becoming the most powerful multilateral organization engaged in the external support of mass education. Bank loans for education rapidly expanded between 1968 and the late 1970s, through both IDA and its traditional lending mechanisms. By the end of the decade the World Bank had become the largest single provider of finance for educational development (see table 3 ).
In many ways, the scope and implementation of the new focus on poverty in educational multilateralism during the 1970s suggests a continuation of the contradictions that had surfaced in the educational work of Unesco during the 1960s. In all three multilateral organizations described here and among most bilateral donors, resources still flowed predominantly toward 59 World Bank, from their website, (www.worldbank.org) (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1996). Gibbon comments, "pro-poor policies in these years were firmly within-and constituted a logical extension of-the prevailing development model. Poverty in rural areas was identified with so-called 'subsistence' agriculture, low levels of productivity, and 'backward' technologies. Mitigating it therefore involved a crash program of modernization, the main effects of which would be to raise productivity, as well as the marketed surplus and thereby incomes" (pp. 194-95). secondary and tertiary education and to the technical and scientific fields associated with modernization. Ironically, it was in the World Bank and the more service-oriented UN specialized agencies-both removed to some degree from NIEO demands through their resource base and mandates-that the new consensus about redistributive multilateralism focused on poverty was most successfully translated into new programs and resources for educational development. Here the new poverty programs and their educational cousins offered solutions that were targeted rather than universal, focusing on practical, short-term interventions.
The new poverty agenda thus embodied the emergence of an international consensus that incorporated the humanitarian and social democratic impulses of a large group of core countries while it set significant limits on the South's demands for a new world order. These limits were underscored by the erosion of U.S. funding for development assistance and the rise of World Bank loans as the largest single source of development finance in the later 1970s.63 In this context, the poverty-alleviation approaches to international development and education that emerged in the 1970s could be considered an attempt to construct "an international welfare program to be carried out as far as possible by the poor themselves." 64 In drawing this conclusion, however, we should not forget that limited, yet substantial, changes did occur in the practices of multilateral organizations during this period. These included new attention to the poor as agents in their own development and a recognition of diverse, locally based approaches to development. They also included growing support for multilat-"63 Wood, p. 234. One illustration of the pressures contributing to the erosion of redistributive multilateralism in education is the decline of funding and support during the 1980s for Unesco, which at the beginning of the decade already had faced almost 10 years of disagreement between Third World and Western members over its primary purposes and roles. Unesco's predominantly Third World membership continued to make demands based on arguments related to the NIEO-most notably through calls for a New World Information and Communications Order. These views were fundamentally at odds with the increasingly neoconservative agenda of the organization's major donor, the United States.75 They also came at a time when the Third World's cohesion and power within the UN had itself begun to fragment.76 The U.S. decision to withdraw from Unesco in 1984, followed by Britain and Singapore in 1985, marked a further decline of the only mechanism for postwar educational cooperation founded on universal membership and the equal participation of nation-state members in decision making." It also signaled the beginning of a decade of U.S.-led attempts to reform the United Nations around more narrow, technical tasks. 78 In practical terms, the withdrawal reduced Unesco's already small budget by about a quarter, which deepened the already wide gap between Unesco's large mandate and modest resources when combined with cuts in UNDP funding for Unesco education work in the 1980s. For the rest of the development assistance channeled to emergencies, humanitarian relief, and Eastern Europe is taken into consideration. As advanced capitalist countries slowed their support for the redistributive forms of multilateralism embodied in UN institutions during the 1980s, they also began to heighten their involvement in other forms that shut out developing countries. Examples of this include the OECD, which increasingly became a forum for Northern countries to discuss the expansion of regional economic multilateralism to help a bloc of advanced capitalist countries adjust to a new world economy (e.g., NAFTA and the EU). These forms of multilateralism can be described as "defensive," insofar as they equipped advanced capitalist countries with educational defenses suitable for heightened competition in the context of economic globalization. They are "disciplinary" in that they helped diffuse neoliberal approaches to public policies developed in the United States and Britain, placing particular emphasis on the use of cross-national comparison to show the relative efficiencies of downsizing the state and reorganizing the public institutions in which the rights and entitlements of the social welfare compromise were forged. 79 Relatively little has been written about the educational activities of these multilateral organizations and arrangements, and more needs to be learned about how they are changing the overall shape of international relations in education. Some of these new multilateral agreements, such as NAFTA, contain no notions of common welfare and social security, while others, including the EU, only recently have begun to incorporate common agreements 79 See Gill (n. 69 above); and Colclough and Manor (n. 48 above) on the rise of neoliberal ideas and the role international organizations have played in their spread. Cox, "Multilateralism and World Order," describes new regional and defensive forms of multilateralism. and norms in respect to social welfare and social security. The EU's approach to educational cooperation has remained significantly more limited, focusing primarily on intellectual exchange and transferability of diplomas and degrees rather than redistribution or equality of opportunity.80
Among these new types of multilateralism, the OECD provides perhaps the clearest example of a shift toward defensive and disciplinary forms. The OECD has displaced Unesco as the central forum for educational policy coordination among advanced capitalist countries and is now the main multilateral provider of cross-national educational statistics and research in the North.81 The OECD's central focus in education for almost 2 decades has been how to adjust education to changing economic requirements in the context of stagnating budgets.82 In recent years its work has been profoundly shaped by the U.S. emphasis on privatization, choice, standards, and crossnational testing-issues that reflect a much broader reordering of domestic politics in that country.83
"Education for All" and the Neoliberal Reorganization of Educational Aid
The rise of neoliberalism within the advanced capitalist world had a somewhat paradoxical impact on educational aid. As we have seen, it contributed to a decrease in overall donor funding for international development assistance and especially to the destabilization of the UN development activities so key to redistributive forms of educational multilateralism. Yet it also contributed to the creation of stronger, more centralized mechanisms for setting and implementing international educational policies, especially through the World Bank. It is primarily under World Bank auspices that the broad multilateral support for basic education inherited from the 1970s was reformulated during the 1980s to fit the global neoliberal ideology and structure of the late twentieth-century world order.
During the 1980s, the focus on poverty alleviation to which education had become attached in the World Bank was displaced by macroeconomic reform and adjustment. The overarching goals of these programs were to free up prices and markets, increase the economy's export orientation, re- 86 This point deserves some clarification. As Sanford (n. 62 above) points out, spending in social sectors during the 1980s did not decline dramatically, but neither did they grow at the rate suggested by the bank's commitment to poverty alleviation in the late 1970s. See, e.g., World Bank, World Development Report (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1980). There is also considerable evidence that bank research staff committed to poverty alleviation, the most famous being Mahbub ul Haq, were squeezed out. See Gibbon (n. 57 above); and Wood.
87 Like-minded countries include the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, and sometimes Canada, a group that historically has promoted greater attention to humanitarian and poverty issues in international relations. The influence of these countries is greatest on the Bank's IDA facility, which relies on donor governments for regular replenishment. countries.92 They emphasize the more efficient use of inputs (teachers, texts, and tests), the introduction of privatization and choice to increase efficiency, greater reliance on cost recovery through parent and community participation, and a shift of resources from higher to primary education.93 Perhaps even more important, the Bank's educational prescriptions have been implemented through new, disciplinary modalities of educational multilateralism: programs of sector-wide educational financing and adjustment and the strategic use of policy-and conditionality-based lending. In a sense, this shift completes the historical displacement of grant-based forms of development cooperation delivered through multilateral organizations democratically accountable to sovereign member nations. It also raises the Bank from a role as the largest single financier of international educational development to being its most powerful ideologue and regulator. Yet World Bank efforts to lead the "education for all" movement have remained fraught with contradictions, both at the level of ideology and of practice. Some of these are amplifications of earlier contradictions in educational multilateralism-the Bank continues to emphasize economic outcomes of education rather than its intrinsic value and utilizes a top-down, expert-led, depoliticized model of change clearly at odds with the realities of implementing educational reform.94 There also has been considerable debate and resistance to its educational agenda, reflected in the unease and conflicting goals that have characterized relationships among the WCEFA partners (the World Bank, Unesco, and Unicef), who cling to the development alternatives of the 1970s.95 Few UN organizations or their academic and nongovernmental supporters miss the irony of the Bank's efforts to marry neoliberal policy-based lending to its bid for greater legitimacy as the mediator of "global welfare" and as an "advocate of the poor." 96 Perhaps the most important rupture in the Bank's neoliberal framing of education for all can be found in its failure to rally wider financial support and donor cooperation for its basic education agenda. This time, the failure to raise finance for educational multilateralism reflects not simply a preference among donors for bilateral forms of development assistance over multilateral forms but a broader disengagement of advanced capitalist countries from notions of international development and redistributive multilateralism-a disengagement ironically fueled by the neoliberal vision of world order that the Bank has helped foster. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Bank appears to be hedging its own bets in response to the broader crisis of redistributive educational multilateralism. It is intensifying efforts to build "partnerships" with international and domestic nongovernmental organizations and yet seems to see its own future in enhancing and selling its policy expertise to governments.97 ; Moore (n. 48 above). These same strategies are being attempted in other UN organizations-both Unicef and Unesco have announced that they will in the future focus more on policy, planning, and advice giving and less on direct support for projects. Both are seeking to enhance "partnerships." tional multilateralism took were related to broader political and economic contexts.
Revisioning Educational Multilateralism in a Changing
In conclusion, it is appropriate to consider briefly the future of educational multilateralism and the stance comparativists might take in this regard. I argue that educational multilateralism drew upon the "embedded liberalism" of the postwar order, and both its ideological and material origins can be traced to the institutionalization of a purposive approach to multilateralism that envisaged the promotion of a Keynesian welfare-state societal compromise within advanced capitalist countries. This was accomplished through the expansion and consensual regulation of international economic and political relations. Though vestiges of this order remain in place, it is clear that the postwar order's domestic and international compromises have been displaced by economic globalization and the emergence of neoliberalism as the guiding paradigm for public policy.
One response in comparative education has been self-congratulatory. In the emerging landscape of educational multilateralism, scholars such as Stephen Heyneman speak confidently of a secure market for the "trade" of ideas about educational reform and a growing demand for educational experts in the newly opened market economies of the former Soviet bloc.98 Yet the neoliberal, laissez-faire worldview so closely associated with this stance flies in the face of the mounting insecurities and evidence of (dis)order around us.99 It disregards important lessons about the balance between market and society that critical theorists, as well as scholars like Karl Polanyi, drew so clearly from the struggle against commodification that led to the rise of the welfare state and that subsequent scholars have linked to the rise of limited forms of redistributive multilateralism after 1945.100 Perhaps most important, it ignores the calls for new institutions of global governance that have become predominant among transnational actors-evident in the environmental movement; in nongovernmental campaigns to extend global social rights and entitlements and to increase the accountability of organizations like the IMF, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization; and in the recent election of social democratic governments within the EU.'0o Another response would take the history of societal compromise during this century seriously. It would study and support transnational movements capable of winning a new, more global form of societal compromise, and it would ask, alongside scholars like Cox, what role multilateralism might play in building the social foundation for the emerging world order. "Multilateralism, if it is to seize the opportunity opened by these developments, will be dualistic-one part of it being involved in the present predicaments of the state system, another part probing the social and political foundation of a new order. ... The segments of multilateralism that take on the task of envisaging a world order in this perspective will also foster linkage among supportive social forces . .. and thereby help to build a political base for a globally coherent alternative."102 Creating the social and political foundations-the societal compromise-of a more just world order in an era of globalization will surely involve the construction of more humane, democratic and effective mechanisms of global governance, particularly around issues such as education, which are tightly bound into international notions of equality, social security, and opportunity. This article has offered a historical starting point, an exploration of the social foundations and contradictions of formal multilateralism in education since 1945. 
